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Conrad's Heart of Darkness in a Kantian Light 
Clive Stroud-Drinkwater 
Is Heart of Darkness a representation of philosophical scepticism? 
In 1924 Ford Madox Ford thought of Conrad as a fellow Impressionist 
(1924, 6), and impressionism traces back to David Hume, who was a 
sceptic. (For a fuller discussion of this matter and, in general, of the roots 
of impressionism, see Watt 1979, 178-80.) There is some doubt about 
categorizing Conrad as an impressionist, however, since he himself ex-
pressed distaste for the style in painting, at least, and he was dead when 
Ford published that view of him (Watt 1979, 172-73). But it is certainly 
not unreasonable to connect the novel with the epistemology of Hume. 
For it is a record of Marlow's flow of experiences as he sails up and down 
the Congo, etc, and the experiences are described in terms of sense 
experience, for the most part. Indeed there are attempts to describe an 
underlying reality that would explain the flow of sense impressions, but 
these fail, typically falling into the word play with adjectives of the 
incomprehensible that has been much criticized. It should, however, be 
noticed that this fall actually represents the failure of the primary 
narrator, Marlow; therefore it can be seen, not as a failure on Conrad's 
part, but as indicating the essential meaninglessness of such attempts as 
Marlow's to get behind the facts of sense impression. In the darkest 
moments of his journey Marlow finds truth in his routine of work on the 
steamer and in a book on such things. His ordinary descriptions of the 
passing scene, both non-human and human, shimmer with the light of 
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truth; it is onlywhen he tries to go beyond that Humean level of reality 
that the light of impressions is replaced by the darkness of transcendental 
metaphysics (as it were)_ Thus it is in fact possible to see the novel as 
representing a fundamentally H umean scepticism. 
Possible but not necessary. I shall argue that it is also possible, and 
perhaps better, to see the novel as Kantian, in a sense that I shall explain. 
This reading makes quite good sense of the facts (upon which Watt 
lucidly comments in the essay cited above) of apparently mixed European 
and British influences on the novel. For Kant was the last great philoso-
pher to have a profound influence on both European and British philoso-
phy. That is to say, it is quite possible to see Hume's influence, such as 
it may be, as reaching Conrad through Kant; and also to see Kant's 
influence, such as I shall maintain that it is, as reaching him through the 
European Impressionists and Symbolists mentioned by Watt (1979, 184). 
But speculation on this historical path, or cluster of paths, is not my main 
purpose. I mention its possibility only to soften the ground for explicitly 
philosophical speculation on the novel itself. 
Hume's scepticism was only philosophical. He knew that in life we 
have no choice but to accept the reality of the external world and the 
inner minds that it provides bodies for. We cannot logically or philo-
sophically justify our beliefs in such things on the basis of sense impres-
sions, which, according to Hume, is the only basis for rational belief that 
we have. Therefore Hume thought that our beliefs in an external world 
and other minds within it, and also our belief in our own mind as a 
transcendent reality are not rational. Yet human nature compels us to 
believe, in spite of what a sound philosophy of reason tells us. These 
beliefs are not rational, they are, in Wittgenstein's haunting phrase, 
"something animal" (1969, remark 359). To that extent, therefore, it 
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misrepresents H ume to represent him, as John Rogers did (quoted by 
Watt 1979, 171), as one "who would have no mind." Hume would have 
mind, and world too, but not on the basis of reason. The welter of 
impressions that arise in perception cause us to believe-- against 
reason. That is Hume in a nutshell. 
The trouble is that causation allows gaps even where they affront 
reason. Nothing in fact causes Marlow to hold any determinate belief 
about Kurtz's mind. Rather Marlow is drawn this way and that, attract-
ed, repelled, but ever unable to rest or settle on a definite view of Kurtz's 
mind. Marlow's natural reason is unsettled by this situation, this haze of 
indeterminacy where reason demands fact. But Hume would not have 
objected. He would have said, I think, that the mind of any person exists 
as an object of belief, but not of the perfectly formed belief demanded by 
reason. The resulting view is that the mind of Kurtz is there before 
Marlow, but it has holes, as it were. On this Humean view, the charm of 
the novel is its stark depiction of Marlow's fall between the unfulfillable 
demands of reason (both his and ours) and the animal mechanisms of 
belief formation (again both ours and his). 
Kant criticized Hume's conception of experience. For Kant (rough-
ly speaking) experience is not merely the passing show of sense impres-
sions, for that alone would not point to an objective reality of which the 
passing show comprises the subjective impression. Hume wished to fall 
back on the mechanisms within the human animal that causally generate 
its beliefs (in spite of reason), but Kant found more in the animal than 
impressions of sense and the causes of belief. Kant found, or posited, the 
human mind, with its given capacity to experience objective reality, 
reality, that is to say, as something over-and-against the impressions that 
flow in upon the subject. We cannot, according to Kant, separate what 
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we see from what we know, pace the Impressionists as Gombrich repre-
sents their aim in painting (Gombrich, 406). On the contrary, perceptual 
experience is replete with understanding_ Normal perception presents 
the object itself; not (of course) the Ding an sich, and not the associated 
cluster of sense impressions either, but the empirical object (boat, man, 
tree, river, etc). What remains is then to try to understand the relations 
(e.g. causal) among such given objects. Kant saw the intellectual-
perceptual capacity for objective experience as essential to our being as 
subjects of knowledge. I have indicated how Hume might have read 
Conrad's novel; how might Kant? 
First, I think Kant would have applauded the novel's assertion of the 
fact of an underlying human nature. As a point of Kant scholarship, it 
should be noted that questions, both conceptual and empirical, might have 
arisen concerning the extension of the predicate "is a person," but the 
point is that the extension of that predicate, whatever it may be, is 
identical with the range of the variable of universal quantification which 
is implicit in Kant's generalization from his own case to ours throughout 
his metaphysics and ethics. Conrad simply shares our modern concep-
tion of that predicate, taking it as applying at least to any member of our 
species. Further questions naturally arise concerning what is to count as 
normal, as opposed to insane, etc; but these questions do not concern us 
here. What is important for us in the Kantian conception is just the 
following point. The flow of sense experience does not force us to a 
seamless and complete web of beliefs about the external world or the 
minds within it; but within the limits set by a critique of reason, we can 
be sure that the world is out there, and the mind within the person, intact 
and seamless within those limits. Both the external world and the mind 
are therefore legitimate. subjects for inquiry, rational and scientific. 
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Here, then, is the Kantian motive for the proper (i.e. critically sound) 
application of reason, within the bounds of sense. We should not, that is 
to say, try to apply reason to questions beyond the natural world (to 
questions about God or the limits of time and space, or to the transcenden-
tal self, for example) . But the mind of man, regarded as a subject of 
empirical psychology, is a proper field for rational inquiry. 
A life informed by experience and reason teaches us that there are 
fundamental features common to all human beings. That is one of the 
themes of this novel, as Marlow confronts the savagery of the European 
pilgrims and the cannibals, and its opposite in the African woman and the 
Intended, or the cruelty of both African rituals and European bureau-
cracy. Watt (1979, 191-92) supposes that the knitters represent the 
nonhuman or the dehumanized, but I disagree: they represent an aspect of 
universal humanity, whether we like it or not. It would be a mistake, a 
kind of upside-down racism in fact, to see the darkness in the story as 
essentially European, or to say of the Africans, with Watt (2000, 88), that 
"we must surely make them superior as human beings to their white 
masters," or with Singh (1978, 49) that theirs is "a simpler and more 
honest way of life"; since we (who recognize that they are human) may 
be sure the Africans share in our (all too human) darkness. But as their 
virtues are hidden from us, so too are many, if not all, of their vices. All 
of this is, of course, just to say that Kant would have applauded the 
Enlightenment themes implicit in Heart of Darkness. His categorical 
imperatives are, or should be, of genuinely universal application across 
our species, not restricted to one division of humankind; Kant would not 
have shrunk, as postmodern relativists will shrink, in what a Kantian 
might well regard as their well-meaning confusion, their inverted racism, 
from finding both virtues and vices in another culture (cf. McLauchlin, 
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387). 
According to Watt (2000, 90-91) Marlow thinks of Kurtz as having 
no "innate strength" or "capacity for faithfulness" and "hollow to the 
core," as if we are not all essentially similar in this regard (whether our 
case is correctly described as one of hollowness or not) . But the Kantian 
view is that we are fundamentally similar in the matter of hollowness 
--or its opposite, which we might call moral sense_ And it is not clear 
that Marlow thinks otherwise. After all, if, as Marlow might be taken to 
suggest (Heart of Darkness, 49-50), human moral sense in practice 
depends upon the eyes of neighbours and butchers and policemen, then it 
is not entirely innate. In that case, Kurtz needs the policemen, and so do 
we. The danger of leaving him in Africa, in that case, is not "only 
because staying would mean staying with everything he has done," which 
would cause him to continue "his appalling career," as Watt suggests 
(2000, 91) ; the danger lies in his being away from the neighbours and 
policemen of his own culture. For at this point in his storytelling, 
Marlow seems to believe that Kurtz, and all of us, may in practice depend 
upon them for moral direction. But it is only at this point in his story-
telling that Marlow seems to believe that. As his story unfolds, so too 
does his understanding of the story and of being human. Saunders (1991, 
xxviii) said of Ford's The Good Soldier that it "is a profound investiga-
tion, not only into why, and how, people deceive each other sexually and 
socially, but also into why people tell stories, and listen to them, or read 
them." Conrad's Heart of Darkness is a similar investigation. The 
stories that are told may well give us the most direct access conceivable 
(one that God himself could not improve upon) into the developing mind 
of the storyteller. 
The Africans have no language that Marlow knows, but inexorably 
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he is led to see that they are like him. Kurtz, on the other hand, speaks 
Marlow's language, but that is of no use to Marlow in trying to see into 
Kurtz's soul, to find some common spiritual ground with him. The same 
point could be made with regard to the bureaucrats, the harlequin, and 
others who speak Marlow's language: they too transcend his powers of 
empathy, whereas the natives whose language is completely unknown to 
Marlow do not, or at least not so completely. The novel thus deals with 
our capacity to know other minds, and therefore to know our own, insofar 
as there are universals of human mentation or emotion at all (as this 
novel seems to posit). 
One central point made is that language is essential for a reasonably 
complete grasp of a mind, but it is not sufficient. Kurtz cannot say what 
it is like to be him, and neither can Marlow say what it is like to be him 
--not even to himself. .Nevertheless we do know, as does Marlow, 
that there are facts about Kurtz's private inner life: there is something 
that it is like to be him ( cf. N agel197 4) . He cannot or will not, or should 
not, tell us, but knowledge that the facts are there, tantalizes us, as it does 
Marlow. On this Kantian view, Marlow falls not between improper 
demands of reason (i.e. for knowledge where there is no truth at all) and 
human tendencies to believe nevertheless, which is the H umean concep-
tion, but rather between knowledge that truth is indeed there (e.g. that 
Kurtz's experience was indeed thus-and-so) and the sense that neverthe-
less it cannot, or should not, be completely known. 
Applied to Kurtz, this theoretical distinction, which hinges on that 
between unknowable reality and non-reality, may seem pointless. 
Applied to the Africans, however, the point is sharp. Commonly the 
novel is read as being about Kurtz as one of us. It is supposed that the 
Africans shed light (or meaningful darkness) on him, and therefore 
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indirectly on us. The Kantian reading suggests inverting this order of 
illumination. Kurtz's reality is there, although unspoken, perhaps un-
speakable (in one sense or another), and so is the reality of the Africans, 
although here the gap between us, as represented by Marlow, and the 
elusive reality is wider. We cannot form a seamless and gap-less concep-
tion of what it is like to be him or them; but we know that at some deep 
level of description it is what it is like to be us_ Behind the veil, beyond 
the gap, the Africans are essentially like us (that is to say, at the level of 
human nature). Marlow hints at the disturbing nature of this thought of 
common humanity between them and us. Kurtz has seen the common 
humanity. What is profoundly disturbing for Marlow is the final horror 
for Kurtz. 
The novel is sometimes said to be racist (see e.g. Achebe), in that it. 
dismisses the Africans as mere savages without intelligible language. On 
the contrary, the Kantian belief in common human nature implies that we 
too are savage if they are. The novel then emerges as a commentary on 
the superficiality of all culture in comparison to the depths of human 
nature. The unintelligibility of the native's language is only unintel-
ligibility for us who do not speak it. It represents our ignorance. Kurtz, 
however, shows us that sharing a language is not as important as we may 
suppose. What is most important is the human reality about which we 
may not be able to speak at all, but know, to some extent although not 
completely, in ourselves, and therefore suppose to be present in others, 
independently of any shared language (or culture). 
Heart of Darkness seems at first to be largely, if not exclusively, 
concerned with the horrible aspects of human reality. Until, that is, the 
encounter with the Intended. She displays another aspect of human 
nature, another aspect common to all, including of course Kurtz, as she is 
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concerned. to assert (in her claim that he too was noble in a way) . 
Marlow's final lie is, he says, a way of "bowing my head before the faith 
that was in her, before that great and saving illusion that shone with an 
unearthly glow in the darkness" (Heart of Darkness, 74). True, he 
immediately adds to these words the following: "in the triumphant dark-
ness from which I could not have defended her-- from which I could 
not even defend myself." Yet there is, in that triumphant darkness, the 
light of the saving illusion. In what sense is the darkness triumphant if 
the illusion saves? Marlow does not explain. For here he is indulging 
in his penchant for adjectives when experience fails him. Nevertheless, 
he has seen the glow despite the darkness that seems at times to conquer. 
In that glow he has the inkling of value. McLauchlan (379-80) puts the 
point well; she writes that "the great and 'saving illusion' even though 
illusory, must be allowed to survive ... illusions are not enough to live by, 
but humanity cannot live without them ... " I would add that one cannot 
be human without such saving illusions: they are of our very essence. 
Perhaps they should not be labeled as illusory at all; insofar as they are 
intersubjective, they might better be called appearances (to adopt a term 
from Kant's metaphysics). Certainly they do not suffice to render the 
person who has them "deluded and bloodless," contrary to Watt's opinion 
of the Intended (2000, 88). Therefore I disagree also with Watt's view 
(2000, 93) that "Conrad's story ends horribly enough ... with the lie to the 
Intended"; for the lie saves both her and Marlow. 
Marlow's journey thus teaches him the fundamental Kantian princi-
ple of universal humanity, with its horrors and its redemption. His 
personal distaste for lies, which is one of the social conventions that he 
had made his own, is, he ultimately realizes, relatively unimportant. Far 
more important is the community of human existence that he recognizes 
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in his encounter with the Intended. This too casts further light on what 
might be taken as the true subject of this novel on this reading: the 
Africans. (Here I invert the reading proposed by Kibera; see Hawkins 
1982, 164.) For Marlow sees in the image of the European woman the 
image also of the African woman; Watt (2000, 88) is quite wrong, 
according to the Kantian reading, to see an intended contrast between 
these women. On the Kantian reading tha't I recommend, this seeing of 
the one in the other acquires deeper poignancy. In ourselves, in Kurtz, in 
the Intended, and in the bureaucrats too perhaps, although the novel does 
not explore this theme, we see the Africans, and this is to see humanity 
itself, with its darkness and its light. 
The image of darkness triumphing over light that had pervaded the 
novel up to the final incident is, in my opinion, thus inverted in that 
incident; in this way (to use Conrad's own words), "in the light of the final 
incident, the whole story in all its descriptive detail shall fall into place 
--acquire its value and its significance" (Conrad, Letter to Mr. Black-
wood). It is only because there is light that there is darkness, in this 
metaphor: only where there are ideals can there be horror (cf. McLauch-
lan, 382). 
In the ways I have indicated, the Kantian reading makes sense of the 
novel. It does so without attributing to Conrad either questionable 
Impressionist or questionable Symbolist leanings. (See Watt 1979, 171 ff., 
184 ff.) Whether Conrad is located in the European or the British stream 
of philosophical writing, he could not have escaped influence from Kant. 
In a letter, Conrad wrote that the African "shares with us the conscious-
ness of the universe in which we live," a remark with a keen Kantian 
flavour (see N ajder 1983, 295; cf. Watt 2000, 92). I do not mean to say 
that Conrad's novel should be seen as symbolizing themes from Kant, but 
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only that it was written in a culture, or cultures, alive to such themes (of 
the Enlightenment). Therefore, while it would (of course) be wrong to 
impose a closed Kantian reading on the text (see Watt 1979, 191), it may 
be best to see the text as open to interpretation within the context of this 
philosophical influence, diffuse as it was (and remains). 
In that case, to return to our opening question, is Heart of Darkness 
sceptical or not? It is not. For while Kant taught us to limit the range 
of reason and understanding, he clearly included empirical psychology 
within that range. As I read it, the novel is precisely a fictional study of 
the empirical mind, with no vestige of myth or religion or transcendental 
inclinations beyond those into which Marlow descends in his bad 
moments. The gaps and holes are only epistemic, not ontological. They 
are at most epistemic. They are not necessarily gaps in our understand-
ing that we cannot hope to overcome. Indeed, on the contrary, I have 
said how the novel helps us to overcome the gaps, to fill in the holes, to 
some degree. For instance, Kurtz was known to the Intended, in her 
particular way of knowing him; he was not "a sham whom she never 
really knew" (as Watt claims; 1979, 246): her point of view is not com-
plete, but it is a view of Kurtz, one that perhaps Marlow had not had 
access to until he met her. The picture of the man is filled in as the point 
of view shifts and new aspects are seen: the Intended's view is not in 
conflict with Kurtz's; nor is it in any way refuted by it. Although we may 
want to believe that her Kurtz could not possibly be the man that Marlow 
knew, he was. That is one common way in which the gaps in our 
knowledge of others are filled in (i.e. through such intersubjective percep-
tions, as it were); it gives us a sense of the complexity of persons. 
Another way, one that is less easily achieved, is by seeing in one person 
an image of another. If we can see in ourselves (in Kurtz of course, but 
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also in the Intended and perhaps in Marlow too) the Africans, what might 
at first seem to be imponderable gaps in our knowledge of men diminish. 
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